REMARKS ON VARIOUS BLACK BOOK SECTIONS
The Front Cover defines the Company, deal type and transaction size,
and provides contact information. We generally advise a few pages of color
photographs inside the front cover to make otherwise intangible claims more
concrete. These are usually graphics punctuating
the core variables identified in the Executive Summary.
Early in the summary, we seek to define the solution that the core product or
service addresses. We try to express this in human terms understandable to any
reader. Investors give higher valuations to companies that provide
product-services that solve human problems that they understand.
We also try to identify the five or six core variables that make this Company
unique or successful. This may include (i) a first-time-ever confluence of
industry technology, (ii) proprietary technology, (iii) new government
regulation creating a new market, (iv) a management “dream team,” etc. These
items form the “hook” that will be later be used by brokers or deal
intermediaries that will drive the transaction. The rest of the Black Book,
seeks to fill in the blanks, justify forward projections, and fully disclose
risks and mitigating factors.
The Executive Summary includes summary data related to the historical
performance, projections and the proposed
transaction. In our view, if a compelling case cannot be articulated for the
proposed transaction in one or two pages, the
deal’s valuation can never be maximized.
Most investors do not have time to read entire documents on first pass, but
each has a favorite prism through which they evaluate proposals. Nanosecond
access to relevant sections is essential.
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Order of Sections.
The order of sections in a Black Book is highly dependant on (i) the
transaction type and (ii) needs to explain complex business dynamics in a
logical order. For example, public disclosure memoranda (such as
Form S-1 or Form SB-2) often require relevant issues of Risk Factors, Dilutions, etc.,
to be put upfront, even ahead of details of what business the company is
in. For dealing with sophisticated readers, however, our generic
Black Books generally jump right in to “The Business” – it is these core
realities that drive the deal. |
Corporate Overview
Here we seek to give an understanding of the organic
aspects of the Company such as its evolution, location, size and growth prospects.
Very quickly, we define what business we are in, and paint a picture of “The Problem” in the marketplace that our Company seeks to solve, and summarize “The
Solution” that we provide.
The Company's Solution, in turn, is driven by the details of the
product-service being offered. The burden of proof is on us to make this
Solution tangible. Investors want to see demonstration of a robust, mature
product. At each step, we
translate each of the facets of the product to direct benefits to the buyer or
end user. Fancy technology is of no use unless it solves a human problem
understandable to the reader.
Valuation is maximized if we can demonstrate follow-up
products, or the capability to continually update the current product to remain
competitive. This theme is revisited in Employee, Management, and R&D sections
elsewhere in the Black Book.
The depth that we drill down into Industry Background is a
function of the prospective reader of the Black Book. For a strategic
investors
within the same industry, we need devote less time to describe what is
already known to the reader, and quickly zero in on a synthesis of the
confluence of industry factors and trends that support our case. In
presentations to general audiences (such as to financial investors or public
markets), we use a broader brush and build from the ground up, one brick at a
time. Even for deals proposed only among industry players, we generally try to
avoid industry jargon to allow advisors not associated with the industry
(investment bankers, attorneys, accountants, etc.) to all be thinking as one
mind.
The key in this section is to provide a context for our
“Problem/Solution” discussion earlier. We unveil the dynamics and trends in the
industry. Usually there is a unique confluence of external events (technology,
regulation, awareness) that makes the Company’s product offering timely, and
explains why it had not happened before. This case must be proven, and shown to
be enhanced by forward-looking trends.
It is always useful to have objective third-party studies
that support our claims of growth, which studies may be presented in the
Appendix, particularly if the conclusions are not obvious or pivotal to reducing
perceived business risk in our business offering.
Having defined the product and industry, above, the
burden of proof is on us to show how we will deliver that Product. Each
organization has a unique process involving (i) R&D; (ii) manufacturing (supply
chain management, inventory controls, offshore); (iii) marketing (pricing,
distribution, sales); (iv) human resources (organization, employment, training &
retention, management, culture); (v) intellectual property (patents,
trademarks), (vi) intangibles (reputation, goodwill, customer satisfaction,
branding); and (vii) resources (strategic alliances, networks, finances). Our
goal here is not to detail a laundry list of each aspect ad nauseam (which is
important at the due diligence stage, but not in a concise offering prospectus),
but to paint a compelling picture of selectively taking the 20 or 30 variables
surrounding the company to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt why this endeavor
will succeed. In the interest of full disclosure, we also seek to identify the
main choke points that may destabilize us along with mitigating factors
whenever possible. The message is that we understand the industry dynamics, and
they are compelling. We also need to show downside risks, and structures
put in place to reduce their impact.
With the product now defined, we
can explore the market and how we will sell in that market. The level of detail
in this section is inversely related to the depth that the company
already has enjoyed in the marketplace. The less operating history, the greater
the burden of proof is on us to show we understand the market. For example, HP
does not need to show that it understands the marketplace; a new startup company
has a higher burden of proof in making an intangible tangible.
What are the relevant market
segments (geographical, technological, demographic) for the Company’s
product/service? What products are we selling into which markets?
What are the trends regarding market growth and our market share in each
segment? What are the channels of distribution into each segment?
Where can we expect growth in sales and why? What is our pricing strategy?
What are the channels of
distribution and how will be exploit them? How important is packaging,
branding, and pricing? What segment will we outsource; which will we do
in-house?
While ongoing product lines can point to historical sales,
new products need to prove their potential. Valuation can be maximized by
listing selected (even if encrypted) details of strategic partners, backlog, and
indications of interest. The existence of such interest is paramount in
“proving” the claim that the product is of commercial grade and meets at least
some commercial standards. In the absence of such backlogs, the next best
option is third-party testimony confirming technological milestones, or market
needs.
Thus far, we have (i) defined the product/service against
solving customer problems; (ii) shown our strategic plan to deliver it; (iii)
isolated specific market segments; and (iv) shown a certain commerciality. But
cannot others make the same claims? This section is meant to “prove” our
uniqueness in the marketplace, and establishes (hopefully) certain barriers to
entry that will keep us in the lead.
Usually it is useful to consider the Company against the top three to eight
competitors in a matrix of differentiating factors ranging from resources
(often weaker), to product features (hopefully better), distribution channels
and price. We also need to track share-of-market trends, and identify the
dynamics that brought them about. From this analysis will emerge
differentiating attributes, and a strategy for growth. We consider, too,
indirect competitors (with substitutable products) or potential
competitors (that come from completely unexpected industries). With a little
luck, we can pluck arguments that show (i) a confluence of various technological
changes is dismantling the strong position of former competitors; and (ii)
related changes are handing the baton of growth potential to our new business
model.
Kindred to the competitive
analysis, we look for shifts in government regulation. Sometimes regulation has
a ripple effect in creating new markets that were not there before the
regulation, especially in the case of government mandates or shifts in tax
policies. Even when regulations seem punitive or restrictive to our industry,
their existence can be leveraged into important barriers to entry that keeps the
door shut behind us to others that would otherwise follow us.
Barriers to entry can also be
built from intellectual property such as patents, trademarks, and trade secrets. Such
exclusive rights are pivotal to maximizing valuations for new enterprises,
particularly those whose core is proprietary technology or know-how. As a
practical matter, patents often have limited value since they too often become obsolete before the expiration of the patent term anyway.
However, they are indispensable to argue for maximum corporate valuations, and
often a deal is just not feasible without patent protection for differentiating
technologies. As important as the existence of a patent, is its
geographical coverage (international versus domestic) and scope (specific
claims): Are granted claims only related cosmetic and
peripheral issues, or are they sufficiently broad to block competitors? If
the latter, patents might be best included in the Appendix to anchor the fact.
Even then, we need to demonstrate that our in-house R&D capabilities are
sufficiently robust to keep updating patents to forever stay two steps ahead of
competitors.
Generally, by this point in the
“Business” section, the business case has either been made or not. Facilities
are generally not pivotal, particularly in the information economy where place
is not critical. Obvious exceptions may include (i)
place-bound industries such as hospitality; (ii) where labor costs or expertise
are significant factors to success; or (iii) markets where access to customer or
supplier networks are vital.
Having
access to in-house manufacturing is also declining of importance in today's
economy due to efficient outsourcing. It can even be a liability due to
process inflexibility. For businesses that go against this model, there is
a strong burden of proof required to show otherwise.
Even in the cases of
outsourcing, however, it is important to discuss any inventory control systems,
which are useful to leverage the investors
dollars to do the maximum good without tying up resources in non-productive
assets. Also critical may be supply chain management wherein suppliers
become a virtual extension of the Company's abilities to deliver its
product-service to customers.
Wealth is not created by
machines, but by individuals. This sections unveils how human beings will be
organized to bring about the operating plans. We detail job titles, departments
and responsibilities. It may also be useful to flesh out policies on
recruitment, training and retention. Often intangibles can be made more
tangible by disclosing detailed time-phased organizational charts. These
details are never used in SEC-related documents to the public, but are useful
for sophisticated investors to visualize Management’s growth plans.
Engineering and R&D operations
within the Company may need special discussion.
For technology-driven companies, it is vital to show that technological
advantages are sustainable, not likely to go obsolete. Today’s economy has
created an environment with tenuous product life cycles, with products whose
competitive advantages can disappear as fast as they arose. The burden of
proof is on us to demonstrate that we have the capabilities to keep ahead of the
curve.
This section is necessary in the
interest of full disclosure, particularly if any lawsuits have a material
adverse affect on the Company. In many cases, an open-ended lawsuit, even one
without merit, can kill investment interest in the most compelling of
companies. If such is the case, the burden of proof is on us to
demonstrate (i) mitigating factors (such as insurance); (ii) that current lawsuits are
“normal” for the industry, suffered equally by competitors and already built
into the cost of sales; or (iii) that the
current litigation has no merit. It is equally important to be straightforward, and
adequately inform potential investors of downside risks.
A major mitigating factor may be
insurance. A discussion on insurance is
vital when the Company is in an industry where lawsuits are endemic or where
contractual protections to limit lawsuits are impractical (such as consumer
products or transportation). While insurance is never useful to achieve one’s
business plans for growth, it provides protection against unforeseen downside
risks. In some instances, it is useful to discuss mitigating factors as to why
insurance policies will not need to be invoked, or what preventive measures are
taken to prevent the rise of lawsuits (such as quality assurance, customer
warnings and contractual provisions).
The quality of Management is one
of the top four determinants of corporate valuation (others are expected cash
flow, risk, and the idiosyncrasies of a strategic investor). For an untested
venture, it is the Number One determinant: a poor business idea well
implemented is better than the best of ideas poorly implemented. A Steven
Spielberg can make a poor screenplay into a blockbuster, better than an unknown
producer could implement the
most brilliant of plots. Too often, the Management section in Black Books
is neglected. Before engaging in an offering, valuation can be maximized
by either upgrading the quality of Management, or having “sample” candidates
hand selected that can be tapped once funding is completed.
Optimized Management has (i)
“done it” before (built a company in the same or similar industry); (ii) academic and business depth; (iii) members with
different points of view (not all engineers or not all marketing); (iv)
worked together successfully as a team before; and (v) driving passion for the
enterprise. “Management” in this context includes (a) the composition of the
Board of Directors; (b) senior officers and executives; and, if these two groups
are collectively inadequate, they can be supplemented by (c) a hand-picked Board
of Advisors with industry heavyweights. We try to look for weaknesses or holes
in the Management composition and look for ways to plug them.
As important as the composition
of Management, is how they are given incentive. To optimize valuation, we look for
salaries at 60-100% of market values (low guarantees), but with generous stock
and options (high incentive). Deals too heavy in salaries, particularly if they
are to a bloated and redundant Management, reduces valuations. Similarly, if
stock is too generous, it potentially dilutes incoming investors.
Valuations are further enhanced
where Board Committees are defined to create checks and balances, particularly
by having non-aligned outside directors involved in future salary, bonus, stock
or option grants. Any conflicts of interest or apparent conflicts can reduce
valuations.
The elimination of conflicts or
apparent conflicts does not stop at the Management compensation packages. Any
and all contracts between the Company and third parties in which Management
holds a beneficial interest a anemic to good housekeeping. Most often this
occurs in royalty agreements with inventors, and outsourcing or leasing agreements with entities controlled by Management members. We recommend that it
is usually better to buy out such arrangements with common stock, and present a
conflict-free structure going forward.
Up until now, we have shown that
the Business makes sense: there is a viable product, market, management and
methodology. This section deals with the rights and responsibilities of
incoming investors.
Often Companies look only at the
amount of the Company given up and for what price, but this is simplistic. The
price per share is governed not just by the intrinsic valuation of the Company
as a whole, but also by the specific terms attached to the equity granted.
Generally, the share price, therefore, can be valued upward by creative
structuring of the terms. For this to be optimized, we seek an
understanding of the objectives of the existing stakeholders in the Company.
Our goal is to maximize corporate valuation within the context of maximizing the
objectives of existing stakeholders. There is little point in maximizing
valuation if the end result will take existing stakeholders where they do not
want to go.
Any
proposed financing can be viewed like a move in a chess game: It must be
engaged with a forward-looking strategy that involves the next move and the one
after that. Any financing structure has to be done so as not to encumber
possible future financings. Often privileges granted to incoming investors are
so wide as to effectively close the door to the next round of financing.
Usually multiple objectives
can be best balanced by multiple classes of equity, debt or debt-equity
hybrids. The goal here is to keep the deal as simple as possible (people do not
invest in what they do not understand), but yet sophisticated enough to allow
multiple stakeholders to each maximize their particular objectives. For
example, many straight cash-for-equity investments are optimized by offering two
classes of stock: Common Stock to existing shareholders, and
Preferred Stock to incoming investors. The incoming shareholders, then, can be
assured of certain Board representation, dividend preferences, and control of
unreasonable option or salary grants. At the same time, there are
provisions whereby Preferred Stock converts to Common and the privileges
disappear in the event of certain performance milestones
(such as going public, being acquired or reaching sales of X). There is no single
structure that we apply to all situations, but the starting point is to understand the
objectives of the several stakeholders. From this this foundation is built
the financial structure that realizes the maximum valuation.
Maximizing valuation is also
driven by how the proceeds will be used. The deal valuation is minimized if
money is being used to liquidate existing shareholders, pay off debt
(particularly to current Management), or to finance excessive salaries.
Investors like to see money stay in the Company and be put to useful work.
Unless there is a strong business case for manufacturing in-house, for instance,
there is little reason to tie up capital in facilities that could be better
outsourced.
If Management is bullish about
the Company’s prospects, deal valuation can be maximized by creating investment
commitments against milestones… with the valuation going up at each step.
Raising all the money today needed for the next, say, five years is possible,
but may require giving up too much equity. However, if the Company shows
better on paper than the likely reality a few years out, or if there is a risk
of a business glitz (which usually occurs), it may be best to get all the money
one can as early as possible, but beware that the liquidation of a more mature
business would yield higher valuations: A business is like a tree; it is
worth when it is bearing fruit than when it is just planted.
Use of Proceeds not only
involves how money will be deployed if the offering is fully subscribed, but
should also anticipate the minimum threshold investment that would be
acceptable. Most business models have a minimum critical mass to be
effective, and raising below that threshold may be viewed by incoming investors
as throwing money away. For most transactions, maximum valuations are
achieved when the amount being sought is not excessive beyond what is actually
needed, and that the minimum threshold is not less than 70% (or so) of the
total offering. Obviously each business model has its own dynamic, but the
burden of proof is on the Black Book to show otherwise.
These sections are fairly
standard and fall directly from the existing capital structure and proposed
transaction. It is often expected that incoming investors may be severely
diluted, and valuations are often more based on future prospects than historic
capitalization.
In the course of drafting the
Black Book, we identify the "juggler vein" issues that can destabilize the
Company. We identify these by analyzing (i) the dynamics of
the business and industry, to determine which assumptions and “facts” are on the
critical path of logic as to why the Company would otherwise be successful, (ii)
conflicts of interest, and (iii) other related transaction in the public domain
where risks have already been enumerated. Risks are highly
subjective, and it is not unusual for the Company’s attorneys, security
attorneys or the investment banker to add risks factors of their own.
Generally risk factors fall
into three categories: risk related to (i) the business (internal), (ii) the
industry (external), or (iii) the proposed transaction. It is important to be
as complete as possible in each category. While risk disclosure may lower short-term valuation, it is a valuable insurance policy against downside risks. An investor who was foretold of possible adverse events is more
likely to be a happy investor in the long term.
For less sophisticated investors
(such as any public offering), it is vital to put risk disclosures toward the
front of the Black Book. We generally place it here at the end for
sophisticated institutional investors that need to focus first on the substance
of the deal. Many times security attorneys have well-justified reasons to
highlight risks to avoid conflicts later. Regardless of the type of investor, it is vital that investors
acknowledge that they understand each and every risk before investing.
This section defines the precise
nature of the offering at hand: The price, number of shares, any commissions,
who may invest and on what terms. Usually this section is driven by the
investment bankers involved with a transaction. For maximum valuation, it is
vital that the Black Book is written at a disclosure level consistent with the
type of investors approached (level of sophistication, whether financial or
strategic institutions or individuals). People do not invest in what they do
not understand.
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NOTE ON APPENDICES.
Appendices often (i) contain highly confidential information; and (ii) are
awkward and expensive to duplicate and distribute. Consequently, certain
Black Books are written with general information only, providing the
Appendices (or complete separate “sub books”) on an as-need-to-know-basis. |
Historical Income
Statements and Balance Sheets. It is
important to have historical financial statements going back at least three
years. Non-current years can be in summary format. If the current statement is
audited and by a Big Four accounting firm,
it lowers perceived risk, and drives valuations higher.
Managements’ Discussion. This section
details and explains various business elements as to why year-to-year historical
statements have changed.
Proforma
Income Statements, Cash Flow Analysis and Balance Sheets.
For most business models, the projections should be three to five years into
the future, broken down by month the first year, and by quarter thereafter.
(Certain projects, like public utility companies, require longer time horizons.) Projections should be broken down in sufficient detail to expose all of the
assumptions. Any models that show excessive revenue growth, extraordinary
bottom line profits as a percentage of revenue, or aggressive share-of-market
assumptions may undermine the credibility of the whole offering if assumptions
are not detailed and “proven.”
Usually projections are omitted
from Black Books for less sophisticated investors such as in public offerings because of the
high risks involved in meeting projections. But even in these cases, their development is essential
to convince market makers such as investment bankers and analysts.
Break-Even Analysis. Our Black Books
disclose the profit level and cash flow at various levels of revenue. Most
important is to pinpoint the revenue level which yields neutral cash flow, and
at which level debts can no longer be serviced.
What-If
Analysis. Here we take selected critical
assumptions such as industry growth, price-demand tradeoff curves, government
regulations and costs. If our key assumptions in the Proforma projections
change, what happens to the bottom line? This analysis is vital to (i) convince
investors that the Company has thought through contingency plans, and (ii)
identify key areas for closer analysis.
Usually Black Books are written
for diverse audiences, each using a different “filter”: CEOs, CFOs, marketing
professionals, technologists and others. Consequently, business sections are
properly written with generalist information, with more detailed data for
specific readers placed in Appendices.
In making intangible concepts
more tangible, risks are reduced and valuations increased. Considered here are
materials as required substantiate assumptions on the critical path: sample
brochures and advertising, third-party industry studies, journal articles,
patents and trademarks, blueprints and plans, testimonials and backlog.
Due Diligence items, include the
items above (which “prove” a business case), plus other items related to
business infrastructure such as employment agreements, leases, sales contracts,
royalty agreements, articles of incorporation, bylaws. Each investment banker
and security attorney will have his or her specific requirements. We can work with your team to collect and distribute the appropriate
documents on an as-needed basis. For an outline of our Due Diligence
approach, click here.
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